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1 Introduction 
 
 
Unlike funds obtained from financial institutions, state grants, which are intended to boost 
competitiveness and employment while stimulating investment and innovation, do not have to 
be repaid provided that the purpose of the aid has been achieved. Banerjee & Duflo (2004) and 
Miller & Rojas (2004) refer to funds obtained from financial institutions as one of the most 
significant factors in the growth of an enterprise, and in this regard Beck & Thorsten (2007) draw 
attention to the limited nature of funds accessible to SMEs. It is precisely with a view to softening 
credit constraints that assisted lending programmes (Griffith-Jones et al, 2011) and non-
repayable grants (EuropeanCommissionStateAidScoreboard, 2015) are used. These methods of 
state aid are similar in that they both make procuring factors of production cheaper, and in this 
way exert their economic-stimulus effect. The companies, therefore, do not repay the money in 
cash, but instead generate social value added by achieving economic development objectives. It 
is important to examine this process in more depth, because owing to the moral hazard we can 
observe that, in the absence of appropriate incentives, companies may give preference to 
maximising their own profitability rather than increasing the social value added. 
 
Non-repayable state aids create an additional opportunity to obtain funds for the implementation 
of developments, in excess of what can be achieved with internal funds, and to improve 
competitiveness through a reduction in the acquisition cost of production tools. The operating 
mechanism of financing by commercial banks is as follows: The financial intermediation system 
offers financial resources and requests collateral to secure them, the company repays the principal 
and pays the interest on it. During the provision of direct state aid grants, firms also receive funds 
for a defined purpose, but do not pay interest on it; and if the development objective is fulfilled, 
it does not even have to be paid back. In this event, the state receives social value added in return 
for the financial aid. In the case of bank financing, the moral hazard is that of a company taking 
out a loan in the knowledge that it will be unable to repay it. When it comes to state aid, the 
 received funds do not have to be repaid, so the definition of the moral hazard also changes 
accordingly. In the case of state aid, the basic scenario of the moral hazard is where the 
entrepreneur knows that he or she will not generate social value added, but nevertheless uses or 
applies for the non-repayable grant. 
 
If state grants are paid out, firms can achieve higher accumulation of equity because the paid-out 
amounts of aid are stated as profit-increasing items during the amortisation period. The firms’ 
liquid assets, similarly to projects implemented with non-repayable grants, increase by the value 
of the given year’s profit and depreciation during the maintenance period; but firms that have 
received grants can recognise the part of the previously paid aid apportioned to the given year as 
a profit-increasing item. This means that the profit and retained earnings of the subsidized firms, 
and through this their equity, grows by more. It is through this mechanism that state aid grants 
lead accelerated capital accumulation of firms receiving state aid. 
 
It is in the state’s interest to support projects that benefit society, because this is how firms repay 
the funds transferred to them. It is no simple task to select the cases in which the social value 
added matches the given economic-policy objective. Owing to the asymmetric distribution of 
information, the businessperson knows about several quality parameters relating to his or her 
own project that he or she does not share, or only partially shares, with the bank. This is a passive 
behaviour pattern, resulting in a choice: the entrepreneur plans to use a service that will increase 
his individual profitability, but for the lender it might result in a loss. 
 
Means of reducing moral hazard could be obtaining supplementary information or requesting 
certain amount of internal funds. This makes it possible to achieve a situation in which projects 
that really do have better quality parameters, and thus a better chance of success, receive 
financing or state aid. This is why I am examining more closely the Internal Funds for 
Development, by which I mean the amount of available liquid assets previously generated by the 
firms, which can be used for implementing further development projects. 
  
In case of commercial bank financing moral hazard can be defined as a hidden action, where the 
bank doesn’t know the expected effort level of the firm, effecting the probability of success of 
the project. Using a unified model (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997) analyzed the common situation 
where firms and banks are also equipped with a constrained amount of capital, therefore both 
require outside sources to fund development projects. Firm’s savings are insufficient to fully 
back the planned investment, while banks struggle to ensure enough credit facilities required by 
companies. This is described as credit constraint, a non-equilibrium situation, where changing 
incentives will also not help reaching equilibrium. Increasing interest rates will not improve 
lending, because the market does not believe in, that enterprises would start profitable projects 
or even if they are in position to launch such developments the funds requested for it would be 
used for cross financing purposes. In order to deal with the efficiency of non-refundable subsidies 
we should enhance the original model with central government, which is responsible for it. 
Recently (Berlinger E. J., 2015) (Berlinger, Lovas, & Juhász, 2016)  considered moral hazard 
issues of subsidies. 
 
 
2 Moral Hazard of State Aid  
 
There can be no empirical studies found that discusses moral hazard of EU state aids. This may 
be because it is difficult to analyse an incentive-related problem based on macroeconomic data. 
For this, we need to set up an analytical framework that specifically examines moral hazard in 
relation to state grants. No such theoretical model is available, however, and several reasons for 
this can be identified. Firstly, we can define several forms of state intervention, including but not 
limited to the bail-out of a corporation or sector, the provision of interest free funds of 
development banks, or the granting of direct non-repayable aid. In domestic practice, the 
intermediation system created for the transfer of EU funds to SMEs has a high weight within the 
system of development policy tools. This is also underpinned by the fact that strengthening the 
SME sector is a key economic development objective, which in the 2007-2013 period received 
 HUF 811.5 billion paid out under the Economic Development Operative Programme (GOP), to 
be followed in the 2014-2020 cycle – according to plans – by some HUF 2,733 billion in direct 
aid under the Economic Development and Innovation Operative Programme (GINOP).1  
 
International literature is divided in its views of state intervention. Tirole (2009), following on 
from Holmstorm & Tirole (1997), continues to see the state’s role in corporate lending as being 
limited to bail-out. The analytical background of the Holmstrom & Tirole model could serve as 
an excellent basis for analysing the mechanism of effect of direct state grants; but it must be 
stressed that it views the state’s role as something completely different. It distinguishes between 
fiscal and monetary bail-out, which defines it in different ways. This is the only form in which 
the model defines state aid; that is, as a type of state intervention, and it does not regard the state 
aid examined in my research as an economic stimulus tool. In the Hungarian literature, the 
correlation between moral hazards and grants is investigated by Berlinger et al (2015 and 2016). 
In his detailed analysis of the economic stimulus measures of the 2008 economic crisis, Vives 
(2010) also regards the money pumped into the financial intermediation sector as state aid. The 
author gives an excellent overview of the complete rearrangement of the European banking 
market, in which the financial institutions restructured, or sold and reorganised their operations 
with the aim of reducing their moral hazard. 
 
State intervention was interpreted as taking the form of regulation, which can be defined as a 
trade-off between competition and stability. Berger (2006) proposes a general framework for the 
examination of access to credit by SMEs. They highlight that access to external finance by SMEs 
is both an important theoretical economic issue and a key problem for policy-makers. Kállay 
(2014) examines the spill-over effect of state grants provided to SMEs, which he pinpoints as an 
improvement in income-generating capacity and competitiveness. He proposes that, in addition 
to the abundance of funds, the economic and regulatory environment in which the SMEs 
eventually receive the grants also needs to be examined. A hard-to-predict economic 
environment, and competing aid programmes, give rise to problems like crowding out. It’s 
                                                 
1http://gazdasagfejlesztes.gov.hu/sites/default/files/gazdagsagfejlesztes_2015_kiadvany.pdf 
 important to find the parallels between state grants and bank financing; and use them as a lens 
through which to read research papers which, at first glance, appear to examine entirely different 
issues. Kállay’s study contains an implicit examination of the framework, relating to the 
mechanism of effect of state grants, which Berger (2006) describes explicitly in relation to SME 
lending problems. They describe in detail how the access of SMEs to credit is influenced by the 
structure of the banking system and by government interventions, through their impact on the 
lending methodology.  
 
State intervention is regarded in different ways in the economic literature. The role of the state 
in corporate lending (J. Tirole 2009) sees in bail-out, based on the original (Holmstrom-Tirole 
1996) model, which is a framework for examining the commercial bank lending and following 
(Berlinger, et.al 2016) it is considered also for state aid grants. 
 
Empirical research was linked to car-insurance industry, by statistically measuring the effect of 
introducing incentives, like the bonus reward systems, in which case (Dionne 2005) (Richaudeau 
1999)  proved a significant drop of moral hazard. The price reduction given for accident free 
driving has a positive effect, i.e. there is no need to control the behavior if it can be found an 
incentive forcing the players to co-operate. (Cardon és Hendel 2001) (Abbring, Chiappori és 
Pinquet 2003) analyzed on large data sets the positive effect of any change in submitted claims 
of newly introduced incentives. The empirical analysis of moral hazard in insurance policies 
might be relevant to state-aid grants, if there can be found relevant incentives which might handle 
the unwanted outcomes of subsidies, rather than controlling behavior of firms. The same outcome 
might be achieved in fighting against subsidized development project without real social surplus 
by introducing powerful incentives rather than intending to pose administrative control on firm’s 
spending. There is obviously further research needed in this matter.  
 
By examining policy details of the business development details after the 2008 crisis (Vives 
2010) considers the utilization of state aid grants. It is highlighted that the financial intermediary 
system has dramatically change as commercial banks have sold part of their portfolio and 
 reorganized its internal policies in order to decrease moral hazard. State intervention was 
regarded as regulatory policy, as trade-off between stability and competition. 
 
(A. N. Berger 2006) proposed a general framework for studying the SME’s access to credits, as 
relevant question both in economic theory and highly important for development policy maker. 
We conclude that there are several similarities in commercial bank financing and state-aid 
subsidies, and therefore a similar comprehensive framework would be helpful for understanding 
real effects, however there is no such is available. Due to two basic reasons: once, the form and 
structure of state intervention varies even across member states of the European Union, second, 
the vast variety of the available products and its combinations. (Berger-Udell 2006) contributes 
with a coherence in SME financing, by linking the role of the bank ecosystem with state 
intervention policies to demonstrate how firms can access to credit. 
 
In the framework of commercial bank lending  (A. N. Berger 2006) summarizes the elements of 
items to be considered: methodology of credit policy, the source of information for submission, 
structure of the credit contract and the relationship management. There is a mixture of 
information derived from financial statements and quality information received from other 
sources. The same breakdown would be helpful for investigating state aid policies; therefore, we 
examine the documentary requirements in order to utilize the similarity of commercial bank 
lending experience. 
 
3 The Use of Internal Funds in Development Projects 
 
In what follows, we examine the availability of internal funds in the development projects in 
relation to the grants awarded to the SME sector during the 2007-2013 EU planning cycle. Prior 
to making use of the grants, the firm concerned had differing extents of internal funds. Certain 
firms would have been capable of implementing the entire development project without any 
external help whatsoever. The question is whether it could be regarded as desirable from an 
 economic development perspective to support firms which would anyway be capable of 
implementing the development project without the grant.  
 
The table below shows the ratios of the company’s deposits as percentage of the value of planned 
investment. The first five columns each cover a range of ten percent; companies possessing less 
than one tenth of the expenses of the development to be implemented represented 28 percent of 
all the firms that received aid. Adding together the items in the next four columns shows that 64 
percent of the firms had less than half, while around a fifth of the subsidized firms (15+6 percent) 
would have been able of implementing a larger investment project than originally planned while 
applying for the non-repayable funds. It is also thought-provoking that almost half of the firms 
did not even possess internal funds amounting to 20-30 percent of the total investment cost. 
 
 
0-10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 
50-
100% 
100-
150% 
150% + 
As a 
proportion 
of all firm 
28% 14% 9% 7% 6% 15% 6% 15% 
Cumulative 
value 28% 42% 51% 58% 64% 79% 85% 100% 
Source: own research, palyazat.gov.hu 
Table 1: Savings of firms receiving grants, in percentage of development project cost 
 
SMEs grow if they have sufficient internal funds available for development projects. The market 
value of companies can only be increased by reliably and predictably high cash-generating 
capacity. All ad-hoc or one-off interventions can have a positive impact on the firms’ operation 
and market value. At the time of payment of the grants, however, the research question concerns 
the extent of the positive impact that the one-off intervention could have on the firms’ operation. 
Increasing sales revenues is not an aim, but a tool of the development projects; the primary 
 objective is improving profitable operation, which we can identify as growth in the value of 
equity from the profit accumulated over the years. 
 
When an enterprise implements a development project, production tools are stated in the books 
at their true acquisition cost. In the case of development projects, we would like to show the 
social value added; but this remains hidden, and we can only monitor the impact on economic 
indicators relating to the whole enterprise. As a result of the non-repayable grant, firms’ sales 
revenue increases because during the maintenance period the amount of the grant, which was 
formerly stated as an accrual, can be released and recognised as other revenue. Due to this, in 
comparison with a similar sized competitor implementing a similar-sized project that has not 
received a non-repayable grant, the profit will also increase; and this in turn will raise the value 
of equity through the increase in retained earnings. The social value added takes the form of 
growth in the equity of the companies that have received a grant, which materialises in the growth 
of current assets; in other words, it appears as savings, bank deposits, thereby generating internal 
funds for the next development project. The grant, therefore, is a substantial contribution to the 
firms’ next development project or investment, for which the company will be able to assemble 
the internal funds more quickly due to the increased profitability. 
 
The success of the development policy has to be separated from the success of the firm 
themselves. To be more precise, I propose that the growth in firm’s general profitability should 
not be regarded as the main characteristic. Let’s take a typical, ideal enterprise that has received 
a non-repayable grant and/or discounted credit from a development banking system, and/or any 
credit product from the commercial banking sector. Here there are four possible outcomes, 
depending on whether firms made use of one or both of the loans in addition to the grant. 
Specifically, whether it  
 
 received a grant  
 received a grant and development credit  
  received a grant and a commercial bank loan  
  received a grant, development credit and a commercial bank loan. 
 
If we also examine the possibilities in terms of the internal funds available for implementation 
of the development project, then in one scenario the internal funds would be sufficient, but a 
grant and discounted and/or commercial bank credit are used nevertheless; while in the other,  
the internal funds would not be sufficient, which is why the discounted and/or commercial bank 
credit are used. This makes 10 basic scenarios, which are then supplemented with the additional 
variable of whether a business partner is involved in the development, thus increasing the number 
of possible outcomes to 20. The simplest scenario is that internal funds would be sufficient for 
implementation of the project, but firms implement it accepting a grant. The most complex 
scenario is where firms’ internal funds are not sufficient for implementation of the project, and 
therefore it makes use of a grant, interest-subsidised and market-rate credit, as well as the 
collaboration of a business partner. 
 
The projects implemented in this way can have a negative or positive impact on the cash-
generating capacity of firms as a whole. As a consequence of this, the whole enterprise may go 
from being profitable to being more profitable or less profitable, or from loss-making to being 
profitable, or from loss-making to being less loss-making or more loss-making. These five 
possible outcomes increase the number of basic scenarios defined earlier to one hundred. This 
means that, with respect to grants, there is a total of 100 different possible basic scenarios that 
can be compared with each other to a limited extent. If we examine the impact on social value 
added of the use of a grant by a formerly profitable enterprise that became less profitable after 
using the grant, and which possessed sufficient internal funds for implementation of the 
development project but still made use of a commercial bank loan, then this should be compared 
with an enterprise implementing a development project of a similar volume and size that did not 
receive a grant, but drew down commercial bank funds despite possessing the full amount of 
liquid assets necessary for the implementation.  If there is any divergence in the parameters; that 
is, if we do not compare companies of the same size, then the result will be distorted. However, 
 we cannot forecast the direction of this, and there are no available experiential facts that could 
help us do this. 
 
The costs and risks of implementing the development project are known to firms at the time of 
planning the project, as are the revenue plans and the costs of operation; and based on these, it is 
possible to compile the profit plan for the return on the project, and the cash-flow statement, 
which together can be used to determine the return on the development project.  The grant, 
however, is applied for by an operational business, and accordingly not only does the project 
have to yield a return, but the whole enterprise has to profit from it, since the logic of the aid 
system is based not on projects, but on subsidised firms. 
 
Firms have to define the cost-cutting benefit of the development project, but at the same time it 
needs to identify the additional costs arising due to the requirements of the funding application 
system, as well as the quantifiable costs of the increase in risk. The slowing in the rate of revenue 
growth due to the requirements of the funding application system also has to be determined, 
although it is also possible to assume that this is zero. If all the modifying factors have 
successfully been identified, then it becomes possible to compare the costs and revenues of the 
project implemented under the aid contract with those of the original development project; and 
the difference between these also reflects the bridging costs incurred due to the ex-post financing. 
In this way, the return on the two projects becomes comparable, and thus the difference can also 
be calculated. From this, we can deduce the perceived costs of the assets transferred free of 
charge. 
 
In relation to direct state aid, the moral hazard can be defined as follows: An enterprise applies 
for direct state aid although it does not contribute to an increase in social value added. The formal 
modelling of the moral hazard of direct state aid grants is addressed by mainstream international 
research. The analytical model set up by Homlstrom & Tirole (1997), regarded as a seminal work 
for research into both state aid grands and SME financing, does not examine direct state aid, but 
 investigates the role of the state as a potential source of financial bail-out. Berlinger, Lovas & 
Juhász  (2016) extend the study to encompass direct state aid and assisted loans, but use basic 
assumptions based on which the moral hazard of state aid cannot be investigated in more depth. 
Owing to the assumption of risk-neutral actors, a constant size increase and positive external 
conditions, the conclusions cannot be applied to the problem investigated in my research. We 
might call it second degree moral hazard when firms are excepting state aid grants in order to 
substitute different forms of financing sources or accumulate higher savings. 
 
4 Framework of the tendering process and the contracting phase  
 
The European Commission has the authority to control the state aid subsidies in the European 
Union, and the emphasis is more on formality rather than examining the real effect on social 
surplus. Since there are several segments receiving grants: innovation driven sectors, 
economically underdeveloped regions, start-ups, and more generally small and medium size 
companies, the proper utilization of state funds is highly important from economic development 
policy’s point of view. The most relevant international empirical study concerning this was  
(Banerjee 2004), by investigating the anonymized data of different commercial banks. He 
concluded that return on investment measures the effects of commercial bank financing in both 
developed and underdeveloped markets. 
 
The European Union regulates the forms of state interventions and the types of subsidies. For 
achieving the positive effect, i.e. increase social surplus approx. one percent of GDP was used 
for state aid grants totaling to EUR 100 billion (EuropeanComission, European commision. 
(n.d.)., 2018).  The types of state aid grants show high variety, there cannot be defined such as 
typical subsidy-product, however it is expected that whey will be used for assisting non-
equilibrium market segments, e.g. the micro, small- and medium size enterprises, since SME’s 
face credit constraint and are not able to raise as much credit as they could utilize.  
 
 The 7-year planning period of 2007-2013 made available some new products, such as subsidized 
loan, grants, guarantee programs and venture capital financing as well, however before the 2014-
2020 period new financing methods became available. Independently from the EU the National 
Bank of Hungary targeted the SME’s by making widely available discounted credits in the 
framework of the Increase Development by Loans2 (NHP) program.  
 
The real expenses associated with state-aid grants are awarded in different ways by beneficiaries. 
First, the methodology to determine net present value of the different types of grants is not 
unique, and secondly the perception of temporarily distributed cash-in and outflows might also 
vary. Consider now the several possibilities that companies can choose from if financing needs 
are present: 
 
1. Credit line with a commercial bank 
2. Discounted loan program by a development bank  
3. Venture Capital financing 
4. Capital market financing 
5. State aid subsidy 
 
The firm has exact knowledge about the profitability of its projects, by at least knowing the 
possible highest income and profit from the project. There is however a chance that there will be 
no social surplus after completion, i.e. no increase in profitability or in revenues. This is the moral 
hazard of the state aid financing. It widens the question even more, if we consider that only the 
free money received from the state makes the project feasible, and without this financing it from 
commercial banking sources would have not been possible. 
 
It is therefore highly important to set the precise goal of the investigation, whether we examine 
the successful operation of the development policy, or the intermediary system, or the 
development projects themselves. Furthermore, we aim to analyze the intermediary system 
                                                 
2 We refer here to the Növekedési Hitelprogram (NHP) of National Bank of Hungary 
 responsible for absorbing the state aid grants to SME’s, if we consider that administrative 
measurers might have negligible effect on the success of the development projects. There is 
unfortunately no internationally accepted methodology to detect the effects on economic 
development policy details derived from the state aid subsidized companies. 
 
The grants are transferred to the SME’s after a formal decision, completion of the contracting 
phase and finally after execution of the development project. Monitoring of the project boils 
down to, checking the fulfillment of the administrative requirements, intending to secure that the 
non-refundable grants will not be used for any case related to fraudulent behavior, rather the to 
contribute to boost social surplus.  
 
The communicated goal of the Operational Program of Economic Development3 being part of 
the New Hungarian Development Plan as master document approved by the European 
Committee is economic development, strengthening the knowledge-based economy, supporting 
underdeveloped region, promoting to discover new export markets, and finally supporting the 
permanent economic growth. 
 
For achieving economic development goals there are certain specific objectives defined, called 
priorities: 
(i) Research and development, innovation capacity and cooperation  
(ii) Increasing complex capacity of corporates  
(iii) Developing business infrastructure 
(iv) Access of SME’s to required financing sources  
Certain technical details might influence the tendering process, such as set up and operation of 
the Monitoring, the Governing, and the Paying Authority. Their complex aim indeed is to find 
the balance of achieving development goals of Operational Programs and utilize the possible 
maximum funds available by uncovering fraudulent activity. This activity requires control and 
                                                 
3 In Hungary as GOP (2007-2013) and GINOP (2014-2020) 
 management on quantitative criteria, if powerful qualitative elements would be involved it could 
make the transparent process doubtful.  
 
The state aid subsidy grants of the European Union differentiate across public and private 
companies, government institutes and other organizations. The combination of the requested 
goal, the source, i.e. which European development fund is affected, and the form of subsidy will 
define the finally available maximum of the operational programs. Considering the statistics of 
the European Union, however, we conclude that the share of micro, small- and medium size 
enterprises was less than ten percent of the regional development programs and remained below 
three percent considering the sum of all the domestic subsidies. The huge number of companies 
receiving fund would require modification in the tendering, contracting and monitoring phase, 
but the execution is done by the same government agency.  
 
SME’s might receive European Union’s co-financed state-aid grants, development bank loans or 
financial guarantees. Economic growth is generated by firms with and without subsidies. We 
should consider the effect of firms benefiting from the discretionary policy, in relation to firms, 
which are not. There is no clear theoretical methodology of measuring social surplus. We define 
social surplus based on (Varian 2014) as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. It is not 
possible to measure it for the tens of thousand companies; therefore, we concentrate on the future 
effect of investment decisions on social surplus. Economic growth might be expected from 
increase in profit level of the SME’s; therefore, we examine the potential positive effects of 
receiving grants. 
 
The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became bigger, the project generated larger 
profit and contributed to increase in social surplus, with 
 
1. larger own contribution and larger bank financing, 
2. larger own contribution but smaller bank financing, 
3. smaller own contribution but larger bank financing, 
 
 The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became bigger, but the project generated 
smaller profit and contributed to a lesser increase in social surplus, with 
 
4. larger own contribution and larger bank financing, 
5. larger own contribution but smaller bank financing, 
6. smaller own contribution but larger bank financing, 
 
The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became smaller, but the project generated 
bigger profit and contributed to a higher increase in social surplus, with 
 
7. smaller own contribution and smaller bank financing, 
8. smaller own contribution  
9. smaller bank financing 
 
The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became smaller, but the project generated 
smaller profit and contributed to a lesser increase in social surplus, with 
 
10. smaller own contribution and smaller bank financing, 
11. smaller own contribution  
12. smaller bank financing 
 
After listing all possible outcomes, we examine the effect of the individual cases on economic 
growth. In the first group we have selected the most desirable cases from economic development 
policy perspectives. Social surplus increases with the larger project size, leading to higher 
investment. This would potentially increase employment, bank lending and generate larger profit 
by SME’s. This is in line with the main goal of economic policy, as (BANAI 2017) pointed out.  
 
5 The governing role of documentary requirements  
 
 We can talk about moral hazard in case of the 3 plus 3 elements belonging to the second and 
fourth group, whereby due to the state-aid a different project size was selected, with lesser profit 
generation, i.e. we conclude that the social surplus became also smaller. Moral hazard lies in the 
modified social surplus of the development project, compared to the original intent of the firm 
implementing it without state-aid subsidies. The firm indeed might have different projects 
effecting profitability, therefore there might be misleading to derive the success of the project 
from the company’s overall performance.  
 
Moral hazard of state-aid can be reformulated as firms are accepting subsidies by knowing that 
the new development project will not have the optimum size, it might be bigger or smaller, but 
the increase in net revenues or profit lags behind compared to the original project without any 
restriction of documentary requirements. Any restriction might alter the development project’s 
success, therefore, to understand the planned hidden action of the firm regulators should 
understand what would have been the real project size without state-aid grant, or in other worlds, 
what is the firms understanding of optimum project size. 
 
In the following we turn to the different elements of the state-aid tendering and final contracting 
documentation requirements. The grants can be defined in four different ways regarding 
backwards the effective date: (1) the year of the grant was transferred, or (2) all contracts have 
been mutually signed, or (3) the positive decision was communicated by the authorities, or (4) 
the tender documentation has been submitted. There might be several differences in the effective 
calendar year of the grants, which makes more difficult statistically capture the business 
development effect4. The grants are equipped with the following criteria:  
 
 the calendar year of submitting tender documentation 
 amount of subsidy / grants in tender documentation 
 amount of subsidy / grants in final contract  
                                                 
4 Take the example: submitted in late 2014, decision made in 2015, contracted in early 2016, and financially 
settled only in 2017. This comprises 4 calendar years, making it highly difficult to assign the positive effect of 
business development to a specific year. 
  the calendar year of contract signed 
 amount of subsidy / grants financially settled  
 the calendar year of financial settlement 
 size of the development project 
 own contribution to the project 
 partner’s contributions to the project 
 the form of subsidy 
 the final goal to be achieved using state aid funds 
 
Considering the sets of data to be submitted in the tendering process until the contracting phase 
we can understand all details the information basis, on which the development project is 
accepted, subsidized and monitored.  
 
 Admission of the project  
 
All quantitative project details are presented, including a long-term business plan and an impact 
analysis. All financing needs and sources such as commercial bank loans, other subsidy grants 
and different business partners’ contributions. All documents required for submission have to in 
original format and have to be signed by the company. The tendering process starts with 
introducing the company and the planned development project. Concentrating on the impact of 
the planned project the firm has to prove its capability of proper execution and financial support. 
Beside that a long-term business modelling has to be submitted as well, consisting all relevant 
information in a pre-defined format.  
 
 Proof of legitimacy and completeness check  
 
Any project has to undergo a legitimacy check, which is by definition a quantitative approach. If 
any shortage prevails then there is one single opportunity to deliver the missing documents, 
unless the submission for subsidy will be rejected. 
  
  Content assessment, evaluation and approval  
 
Evaluation is performed by independent personnel on anonym documentation, which should 
ensure a neutral approach to all tenders. Formal elements are checked for validity and by 
considering long term business plan this time the viability and reasonability is analyzed for 
approval. 
 
 Signing the contract of subsidy 
 
After the decision for subsidy has been made the contracts will be signed by both parties, or 
sometimes even by several parties involved. The contract contains all details regarding execution 
of the development projects and also all penalties associated with non-performance or partial 
fulfillment. 
 
 Financial settlement after executing the project 
 
State aid subsidy grants in Hungary for micro, small- and medium size enterprises are post 
financed after execution, if the projects’ indicators are successfully and in detail presented and 
are complete and fully in line with the development policy requirements. This measure is merely 
a snapshot providing no further incentives for company to perform orderly in the standstill period. 
 
 Monitoring phase 
 
The standstill period of the projects the companies shall submit to inspections. The state aid 
subsidy grants shall be only repaid fully or partially if inspectors will ascertain any irregularity. 
Considering the eligible costs, the industry and regional restrictions it has to be shown the fitting 
of the project to certain economic development goals5, detailing start, financial settlement and 
                                                 
5 As an example, we quote the Digital Welfare program setting new standards for IT 
infrastructure related projects  
 end date, standstill obligation period and other limitations. All of these criteria are neutral from 
moral hazard point of view, except eligible expenses, but this is still a restriction and not an 
incentive to alter future actions. Social consultation and dialog might have more positive impact 
on development projects than the disqualification of certain form of expenses. Those are for 
example the rental expenses and the infrastructural investments of research, development and 
innovation, or licenses and know-how rights, or general management costs. The aim of 
monitoring remains simply to prevent any fraudulent activity. 
 
6 Defining Internal Funds for Development 
 
For a high number of firms, we need to determine the indicator that provides the value of internal 
funds necessary for implementing the development projects. At the point of making the 
investment decision, firms need to be aware of their Internal Funds for Development at that 
moment in time. By this we mean existing liquid assets, or those that can be mobilised within a 
relatively short time, over which firms have disposal. In practice, this means cash, bank deposits 
or money invested in securities, and there may also be investment assets which can be sold in the 
given business year, such as real estate, artworks, etc. Here, it is important to note that if there is 
a substantial divergence between the calculated Internal Funds for Development and the available 
liquid assets, then the cause of this divergence might be some operational issue.  
 
For the purpose of investigating the accounting settlement of the grants and their impacts on 
economic development, we can review the publicly available economic data that firm disclose 
annually as a part of their mandatory reporting. When evaluating the business management of a 
company, profitability is one of the most important factors. A direct consequence of the 
accounting settlement of the grants is that the companies receiving grants will grow relative to 
those that have not received them. It is also important, however, to examine how firms would 
manage their resources without the profit-boosting effect of the state aid grant, as this shows how 
the firms’ income-generating capacity would have developed ceteris paribus. It is advisable to 
 perform this analysis on a group of firms of a similar size, which are active in the same sector 
and region.  
 
Submission of the funding application took place during the calendar year, so the values may 
have changed mid-year as a consequence of certain economic events, because 
 payments may already have been made in connection with the funding application 
 there may have been significant movement in the volume of liquid assets, due to the 
change in working capital 
 dividends may have been paid out 
 any payment may have been made in connection with another investment that is the 
subject of a funding application 
 certain financing decisions may have altered the volume of liquid assets 
 personnel-related withdrawals of cash may have occurred. 
 
In what follows, I will examine the potential distorting effect of the individual modifying factors, 
with a view to selecting the most accurate indicator of internal funds for development. While 
firms are aware of the extent of available internal funds at the moment of the investment decision, 
clearly defining this in retrospect can run into difficulties. The possibilities are presented below. 
 
1. Deposits in the year of submitting the application 
This indicator shows the cumulative cash flow, in the event that firms retain all previously 
accumulated profit. Domestic SMEs’ capitalization is low so if the accumulated liquid assets are 
serving as a form of capital replacement in the course of the firm’s operation, then the value of 
deposits may be substantially lower than the profit accumulated in previous years.  
 
2. Deposits in the year prior to submitting the application  
 With this, we can estimate the value of available internal funds more accurately if we assume 
that payments related to implementation of the development project were made in the year of 
submitting the application. In this case, the value of deposits at the end of the previous year better 
expresses the firm’s liquidity position, because this is the amount that may have been available 
when the decision to apply for funding was made. 
 
3. Retained earnings in the year of submitting the application 
Expenses may be incurred in the interest of the subsudized project after submission of the 
application; but typically, those are due after the decision has been made to grant the aid. 
Consequently, the profit for the given year, and its recognition, could still be important when 
determining the size of the development project. 
 
4. Retained earnings in the year prior to submitting the application 
If we assume that firms make the decision of launching the development project some time in 
advance, then it could be reasonable to look at the value of retained earnings at an earlier point 
in time. 
 
We have to decide what type of balance sheet item could be most suitable for estimating the 
accumulation of an firms’ funds available for development purposes: an asset, namely the firms’ 
more broadly defined liquid assets, or a liability, i.e. the retained earnings. For the investigation, 
it is still necessary to consider whether we are examining these items in the year of submitting 
the application or in the previous year. We could also propose a composite indicator, which 
shows what share of the firms’ retained earnings is available in the form of liquid assets. This 
could be the ratios of the firms’ deposits, retained earnings and equity to each other. However, 
this indicator would only provide information about the firms’ capital structure, and it offers no 
substance for an investigation of the economic-stimulus effect of the grants.  Finally we can 
conclude that, for the empirical studies, observing the economic data of the companies, the 
 retained earnings in the year of submitting the application may be the most precise definition of 
the Internal Funds for Development. 
 
The table below shows the value of retained earnings and volume of deposits measured in the 
year of submitting the application at companies submitting a funding application in each 
individual year.  The last column shows the ratio of retained earnings to deposits. The year 2007, 
the first annual period in the seven-year planning cycle, is not shown in the table because only a 
few hundred firms submitted grant applications in that year. 
 
 
 
 
 
Retained earnings /    Bank Deposits /    Retained earnings /  
 
Project size   Project size   Bank Deposits 
2008 49.249% 
 
25.921% 
 
1.9 
2009 86.350% 
 
46.444% 
 
1.9 
2010 76.711% 
 
36.941% 
 
2.1 
2011 121.662% 
 
75.049% 
 
1.6 
2012 56.098% 
 
26.034% 
 
2.2 
2013 123.652% 
 
57.816% 
 
2.1 
2014 134.968% 
 
41.060% 
 
3.3 
2015 81.510%   55.186%   1.5 
Source: own research, MNB, KSH 
Table 2: Selected data of firms submitting grant applications 
 
 It is clear that in the first three years, the retained earnings of firms that were awarded grants are 
regularly twice the value of their deposits, and this is in line with the eight-year average, which 
shows a figure of 2.1. The years 2011 and 2015 diverged downwards, while in 2014 the 
difference more than tripled. In addition to 2011 and 2015, the year 2014 was also characterised 
by retained earnings that exceeded the project size on average. While there was relative stability 
over the examined eight years in terms of the ratio of retained earnings to deposits, in comparison 
to the project size the volume of deposits moves within a range of 25-75 percent without any real 
trend, and retained earnings were between 49 and 135 percent. The explanation is that, in each 
year, different assisted and commercial-bank financing was available to supplement the grants. 
 
And this brings us to the comparability problem: Based on the economic indicators, we observe 
that the internal funds identified as Internal Funds for Development show considerable trendless 
movement, which signifies the attitude of economic actors to the use of non-repayable grants. In 
the case of non-repayable grants we have defined moral hazard as being the risk of firms utilising 
the aid without creating any social value added; but the empirical observation of this only 
becomes possible in the years following the grant payments, when firms prepare their financial 
statements for the years following payment of the grants, and make them available to the Tax 
Authority and the Controlling Authority managing the grants. From this, it is possible to deduce 
the extent to which firms were able to improve their own economic performance with the non-
repayable funds, and thus create social value added. 
 
7 Summary 
 
Non-repayable state grants are an ex-post funding instrument. This means that firms have to 
possess sufficient funds for full implementation of the funded project, which may consist of 
internal funds, institutional funding sources, bridging funds from a business partner, or other 
tendered funds. It is up to firms to implement the project, and if it can prove that this has taken 
 place in accordance with the terms of funding, then the funds that have been applied for are paid 
out. 
 
It is important to clarify what really takes place between the state and the subsidized enterprise 
when a grant is awarded. One question is whether (1) a reallocation of funds takes place; in other 
words, do firms simply replace their external funding requirements with the cheapest available 
funds, which we refer to as crowding out. If (2) a reallocation of income takes place, then besides 
achieving higher profitability, firms receiving the state aid could also see an increase in capital 
accumulation. This can boost the competitiveness of the assisted firm, thanks to the improvement 
in their capital structure. If (3) a transfer of assets takes place, then the machines, equipment or 
rights come under the firm’ ownership free of charge, thereby increasing the value of the firm.  
 
The most relevant and binding document of the state aid subsidies is the contract.  Substantive 
parts of the documentary requirements consisting both qualitative and quantitative information 
might have impact on moral hazard issues. As we concluded earlier that shortage of qualitative 
criteria limit the useable tools of control, and leave merely a formality check of quantitative data, 
which might help detect fraudulent behavior, but is insufficient to tackle moral hazard issues. 
Closely monitoring all the project could guarantee more success but considering the huge number 
of projects and consequently companies effected, it is not feasible. The next table shows number 
of projects in question. The 7-year planning period between 2007 and 2013, followed two more 
years of project admission, approval and financial settlement resulted in approx. forty thousand 
cases.  
 
If it would be more securities required in advance it would decrease the number of companies 
eligible, which is actually against the basic logic of the state aid subsidies. It is intended to 
subsidies SME’s in order to loosen credit constraint by making available cheap financing sources 
for those companies, which one would have not been able to apply for commercial bank loan. 
Bank collaterals are risk management tools and are not aimed to secure profitability of the 
 company. It is designed to incentives the company management and owners not to lower their 
performance level during project execution and operation, and not to seek for private benefit.  
 
During the approval phase a formal check of the election criteria is done to ensure that all the 
submitted documents are valid and suitable. The substantive parts concentrate on the economic 
rationality and the expected impact on social surplus, all of these are ex-ante commitments, which 
should be closely controlled later. During monitoring and ex-post evaluation, however, there is 
only possible to analyze the company’s performance. 
 
It is still a question what type of documentary requirements could be added, when the 
communicated goal of the operational programs for micro, small- and medium size enterprises 
is strengthening the market presence of those companies. It can be achieved through increase in 
turnover and profit level, which will contribute to increase in accumulated profits and finally 
share equity. First, it should be differentiated between successful closing the development project 
and more profitable operation of the company itself, since the project might generate positive 
revenue, whereas the entire company might perform better or worse. From economic 
development policy point of view the company’s performance should be regarded, however 
during monitoring solely the project. There is need for a detailed business plan of the project 
alone, in which all company internal physical and financial contribution should be accounted on 
the basis of the project. This could allow the Monitoring Authority to have better oversight on 
the subsidized project, which would guarantee at the end of the day the more profitable company 
operation and the fulfilling of economic development goals. 
 
We identified moral hazard as a hidden action of firms, by lowering effort level causing lesser 
probability of success, which is materialized in private benefit instead of increasing social 
surplus. It is straightforward that it is not possible influencing the behavior of companies in 
advance. There is a need for control the behavior of companies after they have received non-
refundable state aid grants, however the documentary requirements con not be made responsible 
for doing this. We conclude furthermore that monitoring can be only made based on the 
requirements set in the original tender documentation and in the contract. As pointed out 
 previously qualitative measurers could be most welcome, however the logic and structure of the 
documentation requires rather quantitative indicators, since the fulfillment is unambiguous.  This 
could be similar to the insurance industry incentives, where there is a proven record of success, 
that offering future financial benefits could have better controlling impact than closely 
monitoring the daily behavior. 
 
If the Monitoring Authority were able to monitor closely the development projects than it could 
encounter moral hazard issues, which could be done on the basis of the documentary 
requirements of the tendering and contracting process. On the long run it would result in 
decreasing number of companies accepting state aid subsidy grants, but in case of successful 
project execution it could be more positive impact on social surplus. If firms in the standstill 
period might expect an effective control process than they would concentrate on keeping the 
promise they made in the tendering phase and they would follow the goals of economic 
development policy and the operational program, respectively. This would, however, raise the 
operating expenses of the intermediary system, which also has to be considered. 
 
